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1. MOTIVATION
3
Tradable emission permits are the 
central environmental policy instrument  
chosen to achieve GHG emissions 
reductions.  
GHG emissions reductions, adaptation 
and the need to achieve a Green 
Economy still is in the agenda of 
international negotiations and plays a 
major role. 
- K. P.
- EU ETS
- RGGI
-16th COP UNFCC
- UNEP (2011)
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1. MOTIVATION
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Long term environmental policies designed to deal 
with the global climate change problem need to 
consider its impact on innovation and technological 
diffusion and vice-versa.
Dynamic instead of static efficiency should, in this 
case, be the criteria used for comparison between 
the different environmental policy instruments.
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Not an argument without opponents
(Kennedy and Laplante (1995) or Zhao (2003), for example)
1. MOTIVATION
5
The literature shows there is not a unique ranking 
of environmental policy instruments regarding their 
effect on technological innovation/ adoption of 
green technologies.
Milliman and Prince (1989), Marin (1991), Biglaiser et al. 
(1995), Jung et al. (1996), Parry (1998), Requate (1998), 
Keohane (1999), Montero (2002), Zhao (2003), Fischer et 
al. (2003), Requate and Unold (2003), Krysiak (2006) and
StorrØsten (2010), are some examples of studies with 
different conclusions concerning this ranking.
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1. MOTIVATION
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For the particular case of EPM, Laffont and Tirole 
(1994, 1996a and 1996b) theoretical studies, for 
example, conclude this policy instrument provides 
less than optimal incentives to innovate but 
excessive investment on existent technologies. 
…. Because firms do not internalise the lost 
revenue imposed on other firms as a consequence 
of not participating in the emission permits market. 
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1. MOTIVATION
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Also, no consensus exist about the (ir)relevance of the 
initial allocation mechanisms of emission permits for 
incentives to innovate/ adopt new technologies.
Milliman and Prince (1989), Jung et al. (1996), Albrecht 
(1999), for example, consider auctioned permits to be 
superior to grandfathered in what concerns the incentives to 
innovate.
Keohane (1999) and Requate and Unold (2003), for 
example, consider them equivalents…
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Result seems to depend from the conditions in the market.
1. MOTIVATION
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OBJECTIVE: to contribute to the empirical 
evidence on the relevance of initial allocation 
mechanisms for marketable permits, on the 
incentives to adopt cleaner technologies. 
METHODOLOGY: 
- experimental. 
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1. MOTIVATION
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Already proven to be extremely advantageous on 
the study of EPM. Innumerous experiments were 
already done to study several aspects of EPM 
functioning (particularly, institutional rules).       
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Cason (2010), for instance, summarizes the 
advantages of this methodology for the study of 
EPM.       
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METHODOLOGICAL 
CHOICE:
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Builds on Botelho, Fernandes and Pinto (2011), 
i.e. laboratory rules try to mimic the European 
Commission choices for the EU ETS implicit at 
the 2003/87/EC Directive: 
 cap-and-trade system
 banking
 double auction with discriminative prices 
(reflecting rules of exchanges)
 penalty structure for incompliance 
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
PARAMETERS chosen for the market intended 
to parallel EU ETS:
 Marginal abatement costs structure based on 
Eyckmans et al. (2000) 
Participants’ dimension proportional to Belgium (S1), 
Spain (S2), Germany (S3), Greece (S4), France (S5), 
Italy (S6), United Kingdom (S7) and Netherlands (S8).
Emissions targets fixed according to EU Burden 
Sharing Agreement (BSA) – but more restrictive.
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Experimental variable (2 treatments): initial 
allocation rule for CO2 emission permits 
 100% Grandfathering (2003/87/EC 
Directive )
 100% Auctioning (Ausubel (2004) rules)
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
(Botelho et al. (2011))
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INITIAL AUCTION STAGE 0
BANKING DECISION STAGE 1
SECONDARY MARKET PARTICIPATION STAGE  2
UNCERTAINTY RESOLUTION STAGE  3 
RECONCILIATION MARKET STAGE  4
RE-BANKING STAGE  5
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
- Additional stage: INVESTMENT
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DECISIONS ABOUT: 
 Cost of investment and its consequences on participants’ 
abatement costs (parameters).
 When to ask for investment decisions (which stage).
 One shot decision, repeated in all periods of the session; 
repeated cumulative investment decisions; unique/ 
irreversible decision.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Few experimental studies on EPM included 
this particular aspect: INVESTMENT 
decisions.
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 Gangadharan, Farrel and Croson (2009)
 Camacho-Cuena, Requate, Waichman (2011)
Nicklisch and Zucchini (2005)
Ben-David et al. (1999, 2000)
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
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Parameters: 
 Constant cost of investment, equal to all 
participants but with different consequences on its 
marginal abatement costs (a 10% reduction on 
marginal abatement costs of 4 participants – the 
“less polutants” – and a 30% reduction for the other 
4 participants – the “more polutants”).
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
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Parameters: 
 Cost of investment strategically determined so as 
to, in equilibrium, only a subset of firms (4) would 
chose to invest (as Gangadharan’s et al. (2009) did, 
for instance – but their decision to invest was public 
information whereas our was private).
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
18Anabela Botelho, Eduarda Fernandes and Lígia Pinto
 Decision about  investment was asked at the 
beginning of every period (from the 2nd onwards)
 A one shot decision, repeated in all periods of the 
session  (as Camacho-Cuena, Requate, Waichman
(2011))
 Irreversible investment decision mistakes  
avoided. 
Opportunity of learning/ practicing this 
decision.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
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INVESTMENT DECISION  (after period 1) STAGE 1
BANKING DECISION
STAGE 2
SECONDARY MARKET PARTICIPATION
STAGE  3
UNCERTAINTY RESOLUTION
STAGE  4 
RECONCILIATION MARKET
STAGE  5
RE-BANKING
STAGE  6
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INITIAL AUCTION 
STAGE  7
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
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ELICITATION OF RISK 
AVERSION  ATTITUDES
1st PART
SOCIOECONOMIC 
QUESTIONNAIRE
2nd PART
3rd PART EMISSION PERMITS 
MARKET
Computerized (zTree) experimental sessions:
Stage 1: Investment
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Stage 1: Investment
22
Stage 2: Auction 
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Stage 2: Auction 
24
Stage 3: Banking 
25
Stage 4: Permits Market 
26
Stage 5: Uncertainty resolution
27
Stage 6: Reconciliation market
28
Stage 7: Re-banking
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3. Preliminary RESULTS 
Only 2 Pilot Sessions run
– Grandfathering 
– Auctioning (a bug on the 8th period did not 
allow the session to run its course until the 
end)
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3. Preliminary RESULTS 
 39 decisions to invest in the Grandfathering
treatment, which represents overinvestment (as 
36 was the equilibrium prediction). However, from 
the subset of 4 firms that should chose to invest 
only 2  unequivocally did so – 9 decisions to 
invest out of 9  periods.
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4. DISCUSSION / NEXT STEPS
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Before running the real session experiments:
In the auctioning treatment, to test the impact of having 
the decision to invest after the auction clears (???).
To review both treatment instructions (to make clearer to 
participants investment decision and its consequences).
To run the real session experiments (hopefully, 
contributing with aditional knowledge about the
importance of emission permits initial allocation
mechanisms on incentives to invest in new abatement 
technologies).
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Thank you for your attention!
